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Review of Philip E. Tetlock, Expert political judgment: How good is it? How
can we know?
Abstract
The book assaults common sense with evidence. In order to mount his assault on accepted wisdom, Tetlock
spends some 238 pages of text explaining his methods and findings, and considering and refuting many
alternative explanations, and adds some 75 pages of technical appendices. The downside of this approach is
that some readers may find the book too demanding. That would be a pity as his findings are important.
Tetlock’s book reports the results of a two-decade long study of expert predictions. He recruited 284 people
whose professions included "commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends." He asked them
to forecast the probability that various situations would or would not occur, picking areas (geographic and
substantive) within and outside their areas of expertise. In addition to eliciting forecasts, Tetlock also asked
questions aimed at understanding how the forecasters came to formulate their forecasts, how they dealt with
the failure of their forecasts, how they responded to contradictory information, and how they evaluated the
probable accuracy of others' theories and predictions. By 2003, he had accumulated 82,361 forecasts, which
provided him a database to evaluate. He then evaluated experts' predictions against outcomes, and against
various alternate predictions that he derived from simple statistical procedures, from uninformed non-experts,
and from well-informed non-experts.
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Author: Philip E. Tetlock is a psychologist who is Professor of Leadership at the Haas School of Business 
at the University of California, Berkeley.  The book combines several of his research interests such as how 
experts learn (or not) from experience and de-biasing judgment and choice to overcome common cognitive 
biases such as belief perseverance and over-confidence.  In 2005 the American Political Science 
Association awarded Expert Political Judgment both the Woodrow Wilson Award for best book published 
on government, politics, or international affairs and the Robert E. Lane Award for best book in political 
psychology.  
Study: Typically, researchers report new findings in scholarly journals and Tetlock (1998, 1999) has done 
so for of some part of the findings of his study.  Still, Tetlock has gone beyond journal articles, turning to a 
book to report on his large-scale and important study.  Publishing a book has allowed him to deal with 
issues in detail and provide a full report, to reach a larger audience, and to have a stronger impact one 
hopes on experts and the consumers of their services, including political leaders and the voting public.   
 
The book assaults common sense with evidence.  In order to mount his assault on accepted wisdom, 
Tetlock spends more some 238 pages of text explaining his methods and findings, and considering and 
refuting many alternative explanations, and adds some 75 pages of technical appendices.  The downside of 
this approach is that some readers may find the book too demanding.  That would be a pity as his findings 
are important.   
 
Tetlock’s book reports the results of a two-decade long study of expert predictions.  He recruited 284 
people whose professions included “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends.”  He 
asked them to forecast the probability that various situations would or would not occur, picking areas 
(geographic and substantive) within and outside their areas of expertise.  In addition to eliciting forecasts, 
Tetlock also asked questions aimed at understanding how the forecasters came to formulate their forecasts, 
how they dealt with the failure of their forecasts, how they responded to contradictory information, and 
how they evaluated the probable accuracy of others’ theories and predictions.  By 2003, he had 
accumulated 82,361 forecasts, which provided him a database to evaluate.  He then evaluated experts’ 
predictions against outcomes, and against various alternate predictions that he derived from simple 
statistical procedures, from uninformed non-experts, and from well-informed non-experts. 
 
Key Findings: The experts barely if at all outperformed informed non-experts and neither group of 
forecasters did well against simple rules and models.  When Tetlock divided outcomes into three states, 
“Better”, “Same”, and “Worse”, the forecasters frequently did worse than assuming that each state is 
equally likely. 
 
* The authors would like to thank Alfred G. Cuzán, Paul Goodwin, Kesten C. Green, and Randall Jones for 
their helpful comments on earlier drafts.  All errors and mischaracterizations remain our responsibility. 
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That experts are no better forecasters than informed non-experts is not a new result.  One of us (Armstrong 
1980), based on a review of about a dozen small-scale studies, proposed the “seersucker theory” of 
forecasting:  “No matter how much evidence exists that seers do not exist, suckers will pay for the 
existence of seers.”  Beyond a low threshold, additional expertise did not result in greater accuracy in 
forecasting, and there was some evidence that those with the most expertise were less effective at using 
new information and thus less able to improve their accuracy. 
 
In analyzing his respondents’ methods of arriving at their forecasts, Tetlock found it insightful to employ 
the metaphor that Isaiah Berlin (1953) took from the Greek poet Archilochus and used in his essay on 
Tolstoy: “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.”  Foxes draw on many ideas 
and sources of information; hedgehogs interpret the world using their favorite theory or dogma.  Foxes are 
more tolerant of ambiguity and uncertainty than hedgehogs, who tend to be confident in the rightness of 
their view of the world. 
 
Tetlock found that foxes usually outperform hedgehogs; foxes produced more accurate forecasts than 
hedgehogs, though again neither beat simple rules.  However, Tetlock reports that he was able to push 
more foxes than hedgehogs into forecasts that violated a fundamental axiom of probability: that the sum of 
a forecaster’s forecast probabilities not exceed one.   
 
Tetlock argues that there is an inverse relationship between what works best in forecasting and what works 
best in the media.  The fox may make the more accurate forecasts, but it is the dramatic, single-minded, 
combative hedgehog ideologue who makes the best TV, especially when matched against an opposite 
number in a point-counterpoint debate.  A debate between foxes will dissolve into a miasma of nuance.  It 
is not surprising then that Batchelor (2007) finds that "Private sector forecasters also have incentives to 
bias their forecasts towards optimism or pessimism,” so as to stand out from the crowd, though we believe 
this is not the key explanation for the existence of hedgehogs. 
 
Understanding the Findings: One reason hedgehogs may survive despite being poorer forecasters than 
foxes is that consumers of the forecasts use both, but for different purposes.  Users of forecasts should 
want to estimate risk, not just the most accurate point estimate of the outcome.  The forecasts that 
hedgehogs provide enable the user to see the range of foreseeable outcomes. Tetlock’s results suggest that 
talking to both a pessimistic hedgehog and an optimistic one introduces little bias as the mean of the 
hedgehogs’ forecasts is little different from the mean of the foxes’ forecasts. 
 
One of us (Tschoegl) worked for six years in Tokyo as a macroeconomist for Swiss Bank Corporation 
(SBC), generating economic forecasts of the Japanese economy for SBC’s fund manager clients in the 
UK, Europe, and elsewhere.  He quickly realized that his clients talked to and read the reports of several 
forecasters from a variety of stockbrokers and research institutes, Japanese and foreign.  The fund mangers 
could not speak to everyone and read everything, so their problem was to find the smallest number of 
sources that would enable them to get both a mean and standard deviation.  Although none used the 
following rule of thumb, it is not a bad characterization of the fund managers’ information gathering 
strategies:   
 
Talk to four foxes, one pessimistic hedgehog and one optimistic hedgehog.  Add the 
forecasts, divide by six to get the mean, and then use the mean and the six forecasts to 
calculate the standard deviation. 
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If the users of forecasts consult hedgehogs to establish the range of foreseeable outcomes, then as Tetlock 
found, hedgehogs should resist more strongly than foxes attempts to sway their views by the introduction 
of an alternative possibility to the one they are already propounding.  The user of the forecasts does not 
want the hedgehogs to move their forecasts towards the consensus when introduced to another possible 
outcome.  The hedgehog’s job is to propose a particular, non-consensus forecast.  Hedgehogs who drift 
towards the middle simply become redundant foxes.   
 
Hedgehogs have the problem of maintaining credibility in the face of being wrong much of the time, and 
consequent vulnerability to hindsight bias.  Ex post, whatever has happened seems more obvious than it 
was ex ante.  When wrong, and hedgehogs will be wrong much of the time, they will seem stupider than 
they actually are.  Why could they not “connect the dots”, after all, many others did so?  Equally, when 
correct, they will seem less clever than they in fact were; they were just lucky, anyone could have 
connected the dots had they just looked carefully.   
 
The hedgehog’s first defense is that of being right enough of the time to remain in the forecast user’s set of 
preferred sources of forecasts.  As Tetlock found, the hedgehogs occasionally got things very right.  The 
successful hedgehogs maintain an optimal distance from the consensus: their forecasts, though not 
consensus, are within the plausible set and worth considering, in part because the foxes have some hits to 
their credit.  These optimally different forecasts are also usefully interesting.   
 
Experimental studies have shown that authentic dissent, such as that of the hedgehogs, is more effective 
than devil’s advocacy.  In their experiments, Nemeth et al. (2001) found that authentic dissenters (that is, 
people arguing for what they believe) were able to get people to focus more on opposing thoughts than 
supporting ones, thus contributing to more opinion change.  One can expect this to lead to a better 
assessment of risks as the experiments of Koriat et al. (1980) demonstrate. 
 
The effectiveness of the hedgehogs’ authentic dissent stems from the users’ realization that the hedgehogs 
are not just making up their arguments.  Furthermore, those with authentic beliefs do a better job in 
arguing their positions than do those who are merely assigned the role.  In Tschoegl’s experience, it is not 
unusual for a user of forecasts to ask the forecaster, “Is that the house opinion or is it yours?”  If the 
forecaster wants the user to consider his forecast seriously, he has to maintain it seriously; a forecaster 
who qualifies his forecast with the words, “I don’t think this is really likely but you should think about it” 
will find his forecasts ignored. 
 
Having used the hedgehogs’ forecasts to develop risk estimates, the users of the forecasts can then look to 
those items where there is the greatest risk, and put their own efforts into thinking about them.  If there is 
widespread disagreement on forecasts that matters, then the user needs to obtain additional forecasts or 
engage in contingency planning.  
 
The hedgehogs’ second defense is an unshakeable conviction in their own rightness.  Ex ante, hedgehogs 
provide a simple, consistent story to support their forecasts and this can seduce the users of forecasts.  
However, because the role of hedgehogs paradoxically is to be usefully wrong much of the time, it is not 
surprising then that we find hedgehogs caught in error employing the various ex post defenses that Tetlock 
documents.  Producing forecasts that leave him out on a limb will generate cognitive dissonance in the 
forecaster; one way for hedgehogs to cope with this is to explain away their errors; as Tetlock suggests, if 
they missed they can say that what they predicted “almost came to pass” or “hasn’t come about yet”.  
Lastly, after an event takes place, if they came close they can then tout the fact that they made a successful 
forecast that everyone else missed.  
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Implications: Tetlock’s primary finding is that political experts are poor forecasters.  He demonstrates 
this with a large sample of forecasts and with comparison to reasonable alternatives.  At the very least, 
then, decisions makers should invest heavily in developing contingency plans as the forecasts by experts 
are of such little value. 
 
What does help?  First, there is safety in numbers, as long as the user of forecasts does this in an objective 
manner: forecasters should draw upon foxes as well as hedgehogs and combine their forecasts.  However, 
putting experts in unstructured groups unaided by any formal techniques only makes things worse in that 
they become more confident without any gain in accuracy.  Thus the automatic reaction to difficult 
problems of “let’s form a committee or study group” of experts might make people feel better in the short 
run, but is unlikely to produce good forecasts (or policies).  
 
Tetlock’s findings should also lead politicians to seek other ways to forecast.  Experts are not the only 
game in town.  As Tetlock shows, simple models will also do better than experts.  These simple models 
are not substitutes for experts; mechanically combining qualitative and quantitative forecasts provides a 
way to increase accuracy, even when one method alone is more accurate than the other, also taken alone. 
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